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When national regulatory programs exempt small-scale operators or
producers from certain requirements, the result looks surprisingly like
federalism. That is, many local (or intrastate) operators end up subject only to
state or local regulations; most national (or interstate) operators end up subject
to federal regulation. While small-scale businesses may rely on these exemptions
in practice, the exemptions are understudied and undertheorized in the legal
scholarship. This Note proposes a new way of looking at exemptions to large
national programs: as "exemption federalism. " In an era when federal
regulatory power is nearly limitless, exemption federalism may prove to be a
significant source and style of contemporary federalism. To illustrate, this Note
takes a close look at one particular statute the 1957 Poultry Products
Inspection Act and its exemptions for small-scale poultry producers. By
examining the historical context of the Act, the debates urrounding its passage,
its expansion, its exemptions, and its practical effect today, this Note traces the
contours of modern American federalism through an agricultural lens. It also
zooms out further, asking where else we can find exemption federalism, where it
comes from, its costs and benefits, and its implications for industries outside of
agriculture, from finance, to healthcare, to housing.
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"The story ofAmerican constitutional law is in many respects an agrarian
fable. "'
Introduction
As late as the twentieth century, small farms in America were basically off-
limits for federal regulators. State and local governments could regulate small
farms, as they had since colonial times,2 but the federal government had no
power over truly local agriculture. By 1957, however, the landscape had changed
completely. Congress passed a series of agricultural laws: from price controls to
labor regulation, from consumer protection to environmental standards. One
such law was the Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA), mandating federal
inspection of nearly every chicken slaughtered in the United States.
This Note tells that story how big government ended up on small farms
but it also tells the story of an important exemption to the PPIA. Growers who
raise fewer than twenty thousand chickens per year are exempted from many of
the inspection requirements of the law; growers who raise fewer than one
thousand chickens are exempted even further.4 Small chicken operations across
the country rely on these exemptions, while cattle and pig operators fight for
similar exemptions from their own inspection laws.5 What accounts for these
exemptions? As Congress found the authority to regulate more and more aspects
of the American farm, why did representatives and senators agree to these local
carve-outs? Where did the poultry exemptions come from, what can account for
them, and how do they apply to American agriculture today?
The answers have implications for understanding American federalism
more generally in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The relationship
between the federal government and the states has evolved throughout the state-
building process of American history: from a "compact theory" of the states to
"dual federalism," to "cooperative federalism," to "coercive federalism," and to,, ,,6
the Court-led "federalism revival. Recent scholarship has focused on a possible
1. Jim Chen, The Story of Wickard v. Filburn: Agriculture, Aggregation, and
Commerce, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 69, 69 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2009).
2. See, e.g., CYNTHIA A. ROBERTS, THE FOOD SAFETY INFORMATION HANDBOOK 91
(2001) (describing a 1641 Massachusetts "Meat and Fish Inspection Law").
3. 21 U.S.C. §§ 451-472 (2018).
4. 21 U.S.C. § 464 (2018); 9 C.F.R. § 381.10 (2018).
5. Abbie F. Swanson, Small Meat Producers Take Their Slaughterhouse Gripes to
Congress, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 15, 2015),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2015/10/15/448942740/small-meat-producers-take
-their-slaughterhouse-gripes-to-congress [https://perma.cc/K6MV-URJ3].
6. See, e.g., KARREN ORREN & STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLICY STATE: AN
AMERICAN PREDICAMENT 92-96 (2017) (outlining the history of theories of American federalism).
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return to cooperative federalism, in which national programs partner with the
states for funding, implementation, or design. But the story of the PPIA
illuminates an underexplored element of modem federalism: the use of
exemptions to leave the choice of whether and how to regulate to the states.
When national regulatory schemes can reach down to the individual consumer,
restaurant, or farmer, modem federalism might best be understood through what
the federal government chooses not to regulate (exemptions) rather than what it
cannot regulate (the ever-shrinking world of "dual federalism") or what it
regulates in conjunction with the states ("cooperative federalism"). This new
way of looking at regulatory carve-outs, as "exemption federalism," might help
us better understand, for instance, the small-business exemptions in the
Affordable Care Act,8 owner-operator exemptions in the Fair Housing Act,9 or,
the subject of this Note, small farmer exemptions from national food safety
regulations.
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I outlines the theory of "exemption
federalism" in general, arguing for its usefulness in describing, justifying, and
critiquing significant federal regulatory programs. Part II is a case study in
exemption federalism, examining the Poultry Products Inspection Act. Section
II.A traces the changing nature of American federalism through the history of
federal regulation of small-scale American farming. Section II.B tells the story
of the PPIA through original research into congressional floor debates and
hearings from 1957 and 1968. This Section explains how the federal poultry
inspection law was passed, how it was amended, and how exemptions were
integrated into the law's text and application. Section II.C discusses how the
PPIA functions today on the nationwide, statewide, and local levels. Part III
returns to "exemption federalism" broadly, further refining the theory and
exploring other potentially significant applications.
I. Exemption Federalism: The Theory
An early and long-lasting understanding of federalism in commerce was
that state governments would regulate local concerns and the federal government
would regulate national concerns. This neat division first gave way to the federal
government's need to regulate local activities with cumulative national impact,10
and then further collapsed under the federal government's effort to find a
constitutional hook for civil-rights legislation." Where, then, can one find
federalism in a world that "acknowledges the almost-infinite reach of the
7. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, What is Federalism in Health Care
For?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1689 (2018).
8. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2018) (limiting "[s]hared responsibility for employers
regarding health coverage" to "applicable large employers" with more than fifty employees).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (2018).
10. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
11. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
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regulatory power of the modem federal government... ?,,12 To Abbe Gluck, the
answer is what she has called "intrastatutory federalism," referring to the ways
in which federal statutes use states as policy-implementers, and thus include
them in regulatory schemes.13 Other scholars have described "federalism by
waiver," whereby state officials can have a substantial role tailoring federal
mandates or programs. 14 This Note proposes a new theory, "exemption
federalism": when national programs exempt small operators from a given
regulation, they can leave a surprisingly large number of operators to state or
local regulation. Furthermore, large operators tend to have a disproportionate
market share in many industries, so exemption federalism can often achieve the
benefits of centralization and decentralization. That is, when small operators are
exempted, most of a market can be regulated from Washington, D.C., while most
market operators are left to local oversight.
An example may help to illuminate the nature of exemption federalism.
Imagine a federal law that regulated the pharmacy industry, with an exemption
for pharmacies with a single location. Every interstate or national chain, by
definition, would fall under the federal statute. Every local "mom-and-pop"
pharmacy would fall under the exemption. Although more than a third of
pharmacies are single-store operations, large chains dominate the market in
terms of revenue and items sold.'5 For example, just two chains CVS and
Walgreens account for nearly forty percent of all prescription drug revenue in
the pharmacy industry.'6 Therefore, this hypothetical law would cover most of
the national pharmacy market, while leaving a substantial number of pharmacies
to state or local regulation. Indeed, any interstate pharmacy would end up
regulated by the national government, while many intrastate pharmacies would
only be subject to state regulation. In other words, despite the fact that this law
is an ambitious, far-reaching, and modem commerce power program, the real-
world result looks a lot like federalism.
12. Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State
Implementation ofFederalLaw in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534,542 (2011).
13. Id at 538.
14. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Federalism by Waiver After the Health Care Case,
in THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS (Gillian Metzger
et al. eds., 2013); David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 265
(2013) (describing waivers as the ability of agencies to unmake specific congressional rules the reverse
of conventional agency delegation, where agencies make rules that Congress left unspecified); Abbe R.
Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes: Health Reform, Medicaid, and the Old-Fashioned Federalists'
Gamble, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1749, 1756 (2013) ("[I]n the same spirit of federalism, Congress often
gives states flexibility to do this federal work; for example ... by allowing states to apply for waivers
from federal requirements .... ); Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996, 2029
(2014) ("[S]cholars recently have begun to see waivers as significant vehicles of federalism.").
15. SK&A, NATIONAL PHARMACY MARKET SUMMARY 3 (2016),
http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2840154-SKA-Pharmacy-List-National-Summary.html
[https://perma.cc/Z9XJ-YXRF].





This example helps clarify where or in which industries we should
expect exemption federalism to have the most descriptive and normative value.
Exemption federalism applies most usefully to industries in which there are
many small players, but large operators dominate output or revenue.' In these
industries, a small-operator exemption will leave most businesses to local
regulation while national standards will still oversee most of the market. This is
the fascinating sweet spot where exemption federalism can achieve the benefits
of both decentralization and centralization: state and local innovation and
accountability for small operators, and product uniformity and baseline market
protections for consumers nationwide. In these industries, most of the drugs, or
financial transactions, or apartment buildings or chickens are subject to
national standards. But many of the providers of these goods remain in a
regulatory environment of state-by-state diversity.
One of the most important and exciting elements of exemption federalism
is that the number of industries embodying these characteristics is growing.
Measures of corporate concentration show the extent to which large operators
dominate the output of a given industry. As long as small players still exist,
industries dominated by large operators are where exemption federalism has the
most to offer. Indeed, increasing corporate concentration is one "of the most
important economic facts of the last few decades .... ,18 In the 893 industries
analyzed by the Census's latest economic survey, the average "share of the top
four firms' revenues ha[d] risen from 26% to 32%" between 1997 and 2012.19 In
other words, the top four firms in the average industry make nearly a third of the
industry's total income and that share is rising. In some industries, the numbers
are even more striking. In secondary market financing, tobacco manufacturing,
warehouse clubs and supercenters, couriers and express delivery services, and
petrochemical manufacturing, the top four firms in each industry account for
90% of the entire industry's revenues.20 In credit card issuing, pharmacies and
drug stores, food service contractors, and consumer lending, the top four firms
in each industry control more than half of that industry's revenue.2'
Nationwide, there are 28.2 million small businesses with fewer than five
hundred employees, and only 17,700 business with more than five hundred
17. In other words, industries where production per operator generally exhibits the
characteristics of the Pareto Principle (the "80/20" rule), or some power law distribution. See, e.g.,
RICHARD KOCH, THE 80/20 PRINCIPLE (1997) (applying the informal rule that 80% of effects in
management and business can often be attributed to 20% of causes); M.E.J. Newman, Power Laws, Pareto
Distributions andZipf's Law, 46 CONTEMP. PHYSICS 323,325 (2005) (noting the "extraordinarily diverse
range of phenomena" that "follow power-law distributions").
18. Neil Irwin, Are Superstar Firms and Amazon Effects Reshaping the Economy?,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/25/upshot/big-corporations-influence-
economy-central-bank.html [https://perma.cc/XB6R-D 82C].
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employees.22 Yet while small businesses make up 99.7% of U.S. firms, they
account for less than half of private-sector output.23 Economic trends in
corporate concentration and jurisprudential trends in federalist theory are both
converging on the usefulness of exemption federalism to describe and justify
various national laws and their exemptions.
This Note now turns to one of those laws, the Poultry Products Inspection
Act, which exhibits all the characteristics that make exemption federalism
interesting. While 75% of American farms make up only 3% of farm sales, the
largest 0.4% of farms account for 32% of farm sales.24 The Poultry Products
Inspection Act takes us through the history of American federalism and into the
next chapter of exemption federalism.
II. The Poultry Products Inspection Act: History and Practice
A. How the Federal Government Got onto Small Farms
The story of the growth of the federal government's power is a familiar one,
as is the related battle between President Franklin Roosevelt and the Supreme
Court. But they are stories typically told in terms of industry, manufacturing, and
the welfare state not farming. Nevertheless, they are deeply agricultural stories
and worth retelling in brief with a focus on the farm.
As late as 1936, in United States v. Butler, the Supreme Court routinely
struck down national agricultural laws as beyond the scope of the Commerce
Clause2 The Agricultural Adjustment Act (A.A.A.) of 1933 was, according to
the Court, "a statutory plan to regulate and control agricultural production, a
matter beyond the powers delegated to the federal government." Justice Owen
Roberts's opinion emphasized that no power "to regulate agricultural production
is given, and therefore legislation by Congress for that purpose is forbidden.' '26
Around the same time as Butler, the Court unanimously struck down the "Live
Poultry Code" of the National Industrial Recovery Act.2  "Neither the
slaughtering nor the sales by defendants were transactions in interstate
commerce," the Court announced. "If the commerce clause were construed to
reach all enterprises [that] ... have an indirect effect upon interstate commerce,
the federal authority would embrace practically all the activities of the people.28
22. Office of Advocacy, Frequently Asked Questions, SMALL BUS. ADMIN. (Mar.
2014), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/FAQ March 2014 0.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4H3-R2A5].
23. Id
24. NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS SERVICE, USDA, 2012 CENSUS OF
AGRICULTURE - CENSUS HIGHLIGHTS FARM ECONOMICS 2 fig.3 (2014),
https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Highlights/2014/Farm Economics/Highlights Farm Economic
s.pdf [https:Hperma.cc/856F-ZWQ5].
25. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
26. Id at 68.
27. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
28. Id. at 546.
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In the radio address announcing his famous Court-packing plan, President
Roosevelt specifically discussed these farm cases as justification for his actions.
He used Butler, "the case holding the A.A.A. unconstitutional," as an example
of pernicious judicial activism that prevented necessary New Deal legislation
from "stabiliz[ing] national agriculture." An agricultural metaphor even
provided the guiding image of President Roosevelt's plan: "[T]he American
form of Government [is] a three horse team .... Two of the horses are pulling
in unison today; the third is not .... It is the American people themselves who
want the furrow plowed.29
When the Justices next considered a New Deal farm bill, they had made
their famous "switch in time. '30 A new Agricultural Adjustment Act set
production limits on wheat and established penalties for excess harvests. Farmer
Roscoe Filburn grew 239 excess bushels "wholly for consumption on the
farm" and was convicted of violating the Act. 3 ' The Court unanimously upheld
his conviction and the constitutionality of the law. "The commerce power," the
Court held, "extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate
commerce ... as to make regulation of them appropriate.32 The Court
continued, in direct contradiction to its earlier farm cases: "[E]ven if appellee's
activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still...
be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce."33 If Congress could use its commerce power to regulate farm-
consumed wheat, it could doubtless repass the kind of law that had earlier been
struck down: a poultry inspection regime. Congress turned to that task in 1957.
B. The Act's Passage, Exemptions, and Amendments
Through the early twentieth century, poultry production was regarded as "a
sideline to farmers" or "a Sunday dinner specialty.34 It was not until after World
War II that American poultry production began to take off. In the 1930s, there
were around one million broilers (chickens raised for meat, not eggs) produced
29. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Mar. 9, 1937),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.phppid 15381 [https:Hperma.cc/YNH9-QP9B].
30. This is the contemporary journalistic, and now conventional, name for the Supreme
Court's about-face in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). See generally WILLIAM E.
LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF
ROOSEVELT (1995). For a revisionist take on the "switch," see BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW
DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998). Finally, for a more modern,
empirical take on the "switch," see Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, Dida Switch in Time Save Nine?, 2
J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 69 (2010).
31. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118 (1942).
32. Id. at 124 (quoting United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119
(1942)).
33. Id at 125.
34. COMM. ON PUB. HEALTH RISK ASSESSMENT OF POULTRY INSPECTION PROGRAMS
OF THE NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, POULTRY INSPECTION: THE BASIS FOR A RISK-ASSESSMENT
APPROACH 12 (1987).
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annually in the United States. By 1957, there were over one billion.35 In late
February of that year, Congress held hearings on a proposed national poultry
inspection law.36 Representatives from the poultry industry, the healthcare
industry, labor unions, consumer organizations, and farm organizations all
presented to the House. "Without exception," the House reported, "all the
witnesses expressed themselves in favor of some type of compulsory poultry
inspection."3  As written, the law would "establish a system of compulsory
inspection by the Federal Government of poultry and poultry prod[ucts] in
interstate commerce and in major intrastate consuming areas of such size and
consequence as to necessarily effect interstate commerce.38
There was ambiguity, therefore, as to how far into local production the law
would actually reach. Indeed, despite the alleged unanimity reported by the
House, there were some critical voices during the Senate hearings. Clement
Thurnbeck, Vice President of the National Turkey Federation, worried about the
bill's impact on small farmers. "[The law] would put out of business many small
farm processors and ultimately would increase the cost of turkeys to the
consumers."39 Senator Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota disagreed: "How would
you put them out of business if you do not even touch them? '40 The bill did in
fact provide for the Secretary of Agriculture to "exempt from specific provisions
... poultry producers [that] ... sell directly to household consumers or
restaurants, hotels, and boarding houses.'
Matt Triggs, of the American Farm Bureau Federation, agreed with
Thurnbeck that inspection would be prohibitively expensive for small farmers,
but he also agreed with Senator Humphrey that small farmers were exempted.
"In most rural areas there are large numbers of poultrymen or very small
slaughtering establishments which market small amounts of poultry in the
adjoining area or community .... It is not practical to provide inspection in such
instances except at prohibitive cost.'"42 But "no one, to our knowledge, has
considered that the extension of mandatory poultry inspection in such instances
would be undertaken under the original language.4 3
35. STEPHEN R. CRUTCHFIELD ET AL., USDA ECON. RES. SERV., AN ECONOMIC
ASSESSMENT OF FOOD SAFETY REGULATIONS: AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIC REPORT No. 755, at 5 (1997),
https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/40807/32409 aer755.pdf~v 0 [https://perma.cc/82HQ-
4CXG].
36. H.R. REP. NO. 85-465 (1957).
37. Id at 2.
38. Id. at 1.
39. Bills to Provide for the Compulsory Inspection by the United States Department of
Agriculture of Poultry & Poultry Products: Hearing on S. 313, S. 645 & S. 1128 Before the S. Comm. on
Agric. & Forestry, 85th Cong. 69 (1957) (statement of Clement Thurnbeck, Nat'l Turkey Fed'n).
40. Id at 73 (statement of Sen. Hubert Humphrey).
41. Poultry Products Inspection Act, Pub. L. No. 85-172, § 15(a)(1), 71 Stat. 441, 447
(1957).




Some experts at the hearings disagreed with the idea that exemptions
should be included at all. Dr. Aaron Haskin, City Health Officer of Newark, New
Jersey, believed that exempting anyone from the requirement that inspected
poultry would be labeled as such "would only confuse the housewife and make
difficult the task of State and local regulatory officials. 44
Nevertheless, despite the competing concerns of interested parties like
Thurnbeck (make exemptions clearer), Humphrey and Triggs (the exemptions
are clear), and Haskin (remove the exemptions), the bill was passed. The Poultry
Products Inspection Act, a bill to "provide for the compulsory inspection by the
United States Department of Agriculture of poultry and poultry products,"
became law on August 28, 1957.45
By 1962, Congress was worried about consumer-protection gaps left by the
PPIA. Apart from federally-inspected slaughterhouses for poultry in interstate
commerce, only twenty-six states otherwise required slaughterhouse inspections
for poultry in intrastate commerce.46 On June 13, 1968, the House debated
revisions to the PPIA. "Change in poultry inspection procedures is clearly
needed," argued Representative Graham Purcell of Texas. "Most poultry moving
in intrastate commerce receives little or no inspection.4 Similar concerns were
voiced in contemporaneous Senate debates. "For the poultry products not
covered [by the 1957 act], inspection service, when provided, is often
inadequate," argued Senator Allen Ellender of Louisiana.48 Congress was
considering a bill that would "exten[d] Federal inspection and regulation to
poultry processed for shipment within the States where the States do not enforce
requirements at least equal to the Federal requirements.'49 Eighty-seven percent
of the poultry in the United States was already being federally inspected. The
proposed amendments to the PPIA would ensure that the "bulk of the 13 percent"
would also be inspected under the federal standards.5" The bill was designed as
a "cooperative effort between the Federal Government and the State
governments," but it was also clearly a nationalizing of poultry inspection
standards.5 ' States could only have their own inspection regimes for intrastate
poultry if those standards were equal to or greater than the federal standards.52
Nevertheless, Congress never seriously debated removing the exemptions
for truly local production from the PPIA. Even Representative Purcell, who
believed national standards were "clearly needed," explained that the new
44. Id at 182 (statement of Dr. Aaron Haskin, City Health Officer, City of Newark,
N.J).
45. Poultry Products Inspection Act §1, 71 Stat. at 441.
46. CRUTCHFIELD, supra note 35, at 5.
47. 114 CONG. REC. H17,065-66 (daily ed. June 13, 1968) (statement of Rep. Graham
Purcell).
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standards would be uniform "[w]ith the exception of the provisions which
provide for exemptions.53 Representative Charles Chamberlain of Michigan
argued that the exemptions were "an equitable way of allowing a truly small
poultry farmer not to have to meet all of the regulations and requirements that
regular commercial farms would be meeting.5 4 Senator Joseph Montoya ofNew
Mexico agreed: "We have some operations which are too small to make it
feasible and would be too costly to require them to meet all the conditions of the
act.' 55 In addition, Senator Montoya moved that the exemptions be capped at a
specific number of birds; he proposed four thousand turkeys per year.56
On August 1, 1968, a Conference Committee worked out the differences
between the House and Senate bills and proposed a final version. There would
be two levels of exemption: one for producers raising fewer than "5,000 turkeys
or an equivalent number of poultry," with four birds of other species being
equivalent to one turkey, and another for producers raising fewer than "250
turkeys, or not more than an equivalent number of birds."'5' Both small-scale
producer classes would be granted exemptions from the PPIA, with the smaller-
scale class receiving greater exemptions.
On August 18, 1968, the revisions "to clarify and otherwise amend the
Poultry Products Inspection Act" became law.58 Now, almost every bird
slaughtered in the United States whether bound for interstate commerce or
local markets would have to submit to the PPIA sanitation and inspection
standards.59
C. Applying the Act: National, State, and Local Levels
As written and amended, the PPIA requires "post mortem inspection of the
carcass of each bird processed," with the processing to occur in "official
establishments.'60 This is the continuous inspection requirement of the Act,
which can be prohibitively expensive for small growers. In a U.S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA)-inspected slaughterhouse, poultry carcasses move down
the processing line at a rate of 140 birds per minute.6' A USDA inspector is
supposed to examine each one. Imagine a relatively small producer raising ten
53. 114 CONG. REC. H17,065-66 (daily ed. June 13, 1968) (statement of Rep. Graham
Purcell).
54. Id at H17,082 (statement of Rep. Charles Chamberlain).
55. 90 CONG. REC. 23,850 (daily ed. July 27, 1968) (statement of Sen. Joseph Montoya)
56. Id
57. H.R. REP. No. 90-1839, at 14 (1968) (Conf. Rep.).
58. Wholesome Poultry Products Act, Pub. L. No. 90-492, 82 Stat. 791 (1968).
59. Apart from minor technical changes in 1982 (substituting "20,000 poultry" and
"1,000" poultry for "5,000 turkeys" and "250 turkeys"), the PPIA and its exemptions are the same today
as they were in 1968. Poultry Products Inspection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-206, 96 Stat. 136 (1982).
60. 21 U.S.C. § 455(b) (2018).
61. Michael Lewis, Inside Trump's Cruel Campaign Against the U.S.D.A. 's Scientists,




thousand birds, and spreading production over the course of the year. At that
rate, the grower would have to find a slaughterhouse willing, each week, to load
in the birds, start up its processing line, run it for just over one minute, shut it
down, clean it up, and ship out the processed birds. It is hard to imagine a
slaughterhouse that would consider a small grower's business remotely
worthwhile. That is before even considering the cost to the farmer of transporting
his or her birds from the farm to the slaughterhouse and back, a cost which could
easily destroy any profit.
62
The key exemptions to the PPIA provide that "[t]he requirements of the Act
and the regulations for inspection of the processing of poultry and poultry
products shall not apply to ... [t]he slaughtering of sound and healthy poultry
... by any poultry producer on his own premises with respect to poultry raised
on his premises.63 The exemption only applies "for distribution by him solely
within such jurisdiction directly to household consumers, restaurants, hotels, and
boardinghouses.64 In addition, the producer cannot buy or sell poultry not raised
on his or her farm, and the poultry cannot move in interstate commerce.
Producers who raise between one thousand and twenty thousand birds must label
their poultry with their name, address, and "Exempted P.L. 90-492."65
Three states, Alabama, Arkansas, and Georgia, each raise more than one
billion chickens per year.66 Around a dozen states raise hundreds of millions of
chickens annually. But other states, for instance, every state in New England,
raise fewer than five hundred thousand chickens per year and are not even
considered "production states" by the USDA.6 To understand how the PPIA's
requirements and exemptions actually operate and vary among states, it is worth
studying a pair of these states in detail. Virginia is a "production state"; in 2012
over two hundred million broilers were raised there.6 8 Connecticut is not a
production state; in the same year, fewer than three hundred thousand birds were
62. In 2017, the average sale price per bird was $3.39. NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL
STATISTICS SERVICE, USDA, POULTRY PRODUCTION AND VALUE: 2017 SUMMARY 5 (2018),
http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/usda/current/PoulProdVa/PoulProdVa-04-27-2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8YQZ-PBKC] ("The value of broilers produced during 2017 was $30.2 billion .... The
total number of broilers produced in 2017 was 8.91 billion .... ").
63. Exemptions for Specified Operations, 9 C.F.R. § 381.10 (2018) (using similar
language to 21 U.S.C. § 464 (2018)).
64. Id § 381.10(a)(6).
65. Id.
66. NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS SERVICE, USDA, POULTRY, supra note 62,
at 6.
67. Id.
68. NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS SERVICE, USDA, 2012 CENSUS OF
AGRICULTURE VIRGINIA 25 tbl.32 (2014),
https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/AgCensus/2012/Full Report/Volume 1, Chapter 1 State Lev
el/Virginia/vavl .pdf [https://perma.ccVXR7-V9SA] [hereinafter VIRGINIA CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE].
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raised there.69 These two states provide illuminating examples of how the PPIA
does and does not apply to American poultry farms."0
According to the latest Census of Agriculture, there were 193 farms in
Connecticut raising broilers in 2012. Nearly all of them, 176 total, raised fewer
than 2,000 birds. Another ten farms raised 2,000 to 15,999 birds, six farms raised
16,000-29,999, and one farm raised 60,000-99,999 birds. Not a single farm in
Connecticut raised over 100,000 birds.7 1 Because the Census ranges and the
exemption limits do not neatly overlap, it is possible that only one farm in all of
Connecticut was subject to the PPIA's requirements.
Nevertheless, as provided for in the 1968 amendments to the PPIA, no state
can establish inspection guidelines below the federal standards. 2 Connecticut's
"Inspection of Poultry Producers" law explicitly pegs its standards to the national
baseline: "Any inspection conducted pursuant to this subsection shall be
consistent with the requirements of the federal Poultry Products Inspection
Act. '73 To accommodate the PPIA exemption, Connecticut has established a
"Small Poultry Processor Inspection Program" ("the Program"). Producers
raising fewer than twenty thousand birds may either go to a USDA-inspected
slaughterhouse or sign up for the Program. The Program requires small farmers
to be certified with the Connecticut Department of Agriculture by submitting
their name, address, number of birds raised, and approximate slaughter schedule.
Small farms are inspected by the Department of Agriculture at least once a year
for waste disposal, sanitation, food-handling, animal-handling, record-keeping,
and water supply compliance. In addition to the annual inspection, the growers
can also be inspected at any time. Once certified through the Program, these
growers can sell to "household consumers, restaurants, or boarding houses."'7
69. NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS SERVICE, USDA, 2012 CENSUS OF
AGRICULTURE CONNECTICUT 25 tbl. 32 (2014),
https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/AgCensus/2012/Full Report/Volume 1, Chapter 1 State Lev
el/Connecticut/ctvl.pdf [https:Hperma.cc/H7EG-8CHS] [hereinafter CONNECTICUT CENSUS OF
AGRIGULTURE].
70. The Farm-to-Consumer Legal Defense Fund maintains, on its website, a very basic
"State-by-State Review of On-Farm Poultry Processing Laws." Poultry Map and Chart, FARM-TO-
CONSUMER LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, https://www.farmtoconsumer.org/poultry-map
[https://perma.cc/N6MS-XNLK]. Some states (Arkansas and Kentucky) have chosen not to adopt the
PPIA exemptions. Most states have adopted the PPIA exemptions, but state laws vary in terms of what
small farmers must do to qualify in terms of permits, sales limitations, or licenses.
71. CONNECTICUT CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE, supra note 69, at 126 tbl.66.
72. 90 CONG. REC. S23,837 (daily ed. July 27, 1968) (statement of Sen. Allen Ellender).
73. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22-326t(b) (2012).
74. CONN. DEP'T. OF AGRIC., POULTRY REQUIREMENTS 1 (2011),
http://www.ct.gov/doag/lib/doag/marketing files/ 16._poultry 11-28-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GYV-
LP5A].
75. CONN. DEP'T. OF AGRIC., SMALL POULTRY PROCESSOR INSPECTION PROGRAM:
COMPLIANCE GUIDE AND APPLICATION 1 (2012),




In Virginia, there were 807 farms raising broilers in 2012.7 6 As in
Connecticut, the most common-sized farm raised fewer than two thousand
birds. Under Virginia state regulations, these hundreds of farms, as well as the
handful producing between two thousand and twenty thousand birds, were
required to apply for and receive a permit to avoid continuous-inspection
requirements.78 The rest of the farms were subject to all of the PPIA's
requirements. Unlike in Connecticut, however, these large farms made up a
substantial portion of the chicken industry in Virginia. Though non-exempt
farms made up merely 59.5% of Virginia's poultry farms by number, they
produced 99.9% of the broilers raised in the state.
Non-exempt farms included those contracting with some of the largest
chicken producers in the country:80 Tyson, Pilgrim's Pride, and Perdue all of
which have a presence in Virginia, though not in Connecticut.81 Together, these
three companies alone produce nearly four billion chickens a year nationwide.82
To put that number in perspective, it would take all the chicken-raising farms in
Connecticut more than 14,000 years to equal the annual production of those three
companies. To put it another way, even if every Connecticut poultry farmer
today had been producing chickens since the dawn of agriculture, together they
still would not have equaled the number of chickens raised by those three
companies last year.
83
Clearly, the Tyson, Perdue, and Pilgrim's chickens were not all raised in a
single state, but from a federalist perspective, that is exactly the point. The largest
operators within any state are likely involved in interstate, or even international,
commerce, whereas the smallest operators may be involved in intrastate
76. VIRGINIA CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE, supra note 68, at 25 tbl.32.
77. Id
78. 2 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-210-30, pt. 303 (2017).
79. VIRGINIA CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE, supra note 68, at 25 tbl.32 (totaling the
production quantities from all the farms raising more than thirty thousand birds).
80. In fact, 96% of chickens were raised by farmers under a production contract for
another operator. NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS SERVICE, USDA, 2012 CENSUS OF
AGRICULTURE - CENSUS HIGHLIGHTS POULTRY AND EGG PRODUCTION 2 (Jan. 2015),
https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Highlights/2015/Poultry and Egg Production.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W2A5-JSS8].
81. Poultry Plants Directory, WATT POULTRYUSA,
https://www.wattagnet.com/ext/resources/uploadedFiles/lOO2USplants.pdf [https://perma.cc/3W77-
8MK9] (listing ten poultry processing plants operated by "integrated broiler compan[ies]" in Virginia, but
none in Connecticut).
82. WATTPoultry USA 's 2016 Top Broiler Companies, WATT POULTRYUSA 17 (Mar.
2016), http://www.wattpoultryusa-
digital.com/fx/save/dbindex.php?book id NXT d51916ba827942edbdca6776425879d6&sid 8b43
775472afeac6f3ddO3dOec5cc250&pdf l [https://perma.cc/JGH5-KZUJ] (working from their average
weekly slaughter numbers of 33.41 million, 28.85 million, and 12.99 million birds).
83. Dividing the roughly 3.9 billion birds slaughtered annually by Tyson, Pilgrim's
Pride, and Perdue by the 265,099 birds slaughtered in the state of Connecticut in 2012 results in more than
14,711 years. Id.; CONNECTICUT CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE, supra note 69, at 25 tbl.32; JAMES SCOTT,
AGAINST THE GRAIN 43-44 (2017) (dating the origins of agriculture to the warming of the planet around
9,600 B.C.E.).
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commerce only. These large operators the ones most likely to have a national
footprint-are subject to national regulation. They raise most of the chickens and
they must submit to continuous USDA inspection. But most of the farms in both
low-production states like Connecticut and high-production states like Virginia
are still small enough to qualify for the PPIA exemption. These small farms exist
in an alternate regulatory world from their federally-inspected Tyson-contracting
neighbors. In Connecticut, for example, these small farms are part of the state's
Small Poultry Processor Inspection Program. In Virginia, they go through the
permitting process organized by the Virginia Department of Agriculture. Poultry
inspection for these local farms is a state, not a federal, matter.
To further examine how the PPIA operates, it is worth zooming in on one
of those local farms. One of the most outspoken advocates for small farms and
farmers is Joel Salatin, author of twelve books on farming and owner of Polyface
Farms in Virginia.84 He raises broilers, turkeys, laying hens, rabbits, cattle, and
pigs, and his work has been featured in the New York Times, documentaries like
Food, Inc., and the best-selling The Omnivore's Dilemma.8" Most importantly
for this Note, Salatin also holds PPIA exemption number 1001 the first issued
in his state.86 While Polyface is a higher-profile farm than most, it too relies on
the small-grower exemption of the PPIA. Although a portrait of one farm is
necessarily anecdotal rather than comprehensive, it can nevertheless help
illustrate how the Act applies locally.
Salatin believes that the PPIA exemption makes small poultry farming
possible. If every farm had to use USDA-inspected slaughterhouses, he argues,
"it would eliminate the outliers from being able to dip their toe in the water and
start."'87 Though the PPIA was intended to protect consumers, Salatin believes
that "risk of abuse, or problems, follow scale." That is, he argues that the
exemption does not just make sense for cost-of-business reasons but also from a
consumer-safety perspective. He believes that the flexibility, openness, and
customer-facing aspects of small farms provide safety in a way agribusiness
cannot. "Do you fear unsafe food?" he asks. "Do you fear food-borne bacteria?
There is a way to have safer food, but you are denied having the most efficacious
way to ensure that safe food by the strict codification of orthodoxy that makes it
inherently difficult for people who innovate safe approaches to get their product
to market."
On one hand, Salatin believes that the "regulatory bureaucracy does not
take this exemption lightly it is well enforced." On the other hand, he
acknowledges that though "the official idea is that someone visits you every
other year ... we haven't had a visit for ten, twelve years." Salatin's impression
84. Joel's Bio, POLYFACE, http://www.polyfacefarms.com/joels-bio
[https://perma.cc/J549-5LN7] (disclosure: the author worked for Joel Salatin in the summer of 2012).
85. MICHAEL POLLAN, THE OMNIVORE'S DILEMMA 300-33 (2006).
86. Telephone Interview with Joel Salatin, Co-owner, Polyface Farms (Nov. 18, 2017).
87. Id All the following quotes from Salatin are from this interview.
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is that the enforcement scheme is complaint-oriented. While inspection might
not happen as often it is supposed to, a consumer complaint would make a farm
an enforcement priority. "Often that's how people are found," Salatin says. But
barring a complaint, most farms will operate "under-the-radar" of the PPIA.
But at small farms like Polyface, Salatin would argue, there is a kind of
inspection that happens every day. Salatin's farm store is on the same concrete
slab as the poultry-slaughtering station. Every time a consumer decides to
purchase meat there, or at similar small farms around the country, the consumer
inevitably "inspects" the operation himself.
More than half of the nearly thirty-three thousand poultry farms in the
nation are, like Salatin's, small enough to qualify for the PPIA exemption.88
Therefore, in states like Connecticut and Virginia, exempted farmers can be
numerous while exempted chickens are rare. Nationwide, these patterns hold.
Despite the fact that most chicken farmers qualify for the PPIA exemption, in
2012, large farms produced 99.9% of all chickens sold.8 9
III.Unpacking Exemptions
Local carve-outs from national regulatory schemes embody federalist
values and can be examined through federalism theory. Exemptions are not just
random loopholes; federalism is not just what the federal government cannot do
but what it chooses not to do. Part I of this Note outlined this theory, while Part
II used agricultural regulation to trace the decline of dual federalism and
illustrate an example of exemption federalism.
We are left, however, with several important questions. First, why did the
federal government exempt small poultry farmers from the PPIA after decades
of fighting for the ability to regulate farms? More generally, the theory of
exemption federalism may accurately describe PPIA-like exemptions but does
not yet account for their origins. What makes a national legislature enact a
federalism-promoting policy? Second, what are the possible limitations or
caveats to the theory? What are possible counterarguments? Third, and finally,
what are possible expansions or further applications for the theory? Where
should we look for it next?
A. Why Exemption Federalism?
It is no stretch to describe as "federalist" a world in which small farmers
are left to state regulation, and large agribusinesses are covered by national laws.
88. NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS SERVICE, USDA, 2012 CENSUS OF
AGRICULTURE UNITED STATES 86 tbl.64 (2014),
https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/AgCensus/2012/Full Report/Volume 1, Chapter 1 US/usvl.p
df [https://perma.cc/3D6Q-LK2T] (reporting 16,514 farms raised fewer than 2,000 chickens out of 32,935
total chicken-raising farms).
89. Id. (totaling the production quantities from all the farms raising more than 30,000
chickens to be 8,457,343,356 out of 8,463,194,794 total chickens sold).
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But why would a national legislature help bring about this world? What is the
motivation for Congress to assume the power of intrastate agricultural
regulation but then voluntarily exempt those farms from national oversight? At
least three component hypotheses may help unpack the motivation behind
national exemptions for local operators. (1) The federal government may not
always have the practical legal ability to regulate truly local concerns. (2) The
federal government may legitimately believe that local practices adequately
regulate some local issues. (3) The federal government may be more responsive
to local pressures than typically understood.
The first hypothesis suggests that the federal government may have been
unable to pass an effective law regulating small farms. Lon Fuller has outlined
"eight ways to fail to make law," only the first of which is not to pass a law at
all.90 His other seven methods are:
(2) a failure to publicize, or at least make available to the affected party, the rules
he is expected to observe; (3) ... retroactive legislation, [which cannot] guide
action ... (4) a failure to make rules understandable; (5) the enactment of
contradictory rules or (6) rules that require conduct beyond the powers of the
affected party; (7) introducing ... frequent changes in the rules ... (8) a failure
of congruence between the rules as announced and their actual administration.
91
In the case of small poultry farmers, methods (2), (4), (6), and (8) may help
explain the PPIA exemptions. Method (2) suggests that many small farmers
might not know about their PPIA obligations. If farmers do not know about the
law, whether through a lack of publicity or perhaps strategic ignorance, the law
would "fail" to have an effect, with or without the exemption. Under method (4),
even if farmers knew about the law, it may not be comprehensible. Without
hiring a lawyer, how can any farmer be sure that their understanding of
"commerce" or "sound and healthy" is the same as the government's? Method
(6) provides for laws that are well-publicized and comprehensible but simply
unachievable. This was the concern of Clement Thurnbeck and others in the
congressional debates of 1957 and 1968: that the requirements of the law would
put small farms out of business.92 Finally, Joel Salatin's comment that Polyface
has rarely been inspected supports method (8). A law will have minimal effect if
the government announces that it will inspect small farms, but never has the
budget for or interest in actually conducting the inspections.
A national law regulating small farms could end up unknown,
incomprehensible, unachievable, or mis-enforced. Any one of these outcomes
90. LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-39 (1964).
91. Id. at 39.
92. See Bills to Provide for the Compulsory Inspection by the United States Department
of Agriculture of Poultry & Poultry Products: Hearing on S. 313, S. 645 & S. 1128 Before the S. Comm.
on Agric. & Forestry, 85th Cong. 69 (1957) (statement of Clement Thurnbeck, Nat'l Turkey Fed'n); 90
CONG. REC. S23,837 (daily ed. July 27, 1968) (statement of Sen. Allen Ellender); 90 CONG. REC.
H17,065-66 (daily ed. June 13, 1968) (statement of Rep. Graham Purcell).
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would be a good reason for the federal government to simply exempt small farms
from the law in the first place. The PPIA exemptions may, therefore, be a real-
world example of Fuller's thesis. According to Fuller, laws that can work are a
subset of laws that can be passed. Normatively, this first hypothesis provides
justification for appreciating, exploring, and accepting the ways in which the
federal government cannot solve all problems. Rather than pass a law that "fails,"
the federal government can exempt hard-to-reach sectors of society or the
economy.
The second hypothesis suggests hat sometimes the relevant issue is not the
federal government's competence in regulating a local issue, but the locality's
competence in regulating itself. Under this theory, the federal government is
willing to allow community expertise or norms to regulate exempted areas.
When the federal government decides to exempt small farmers from inspection,
the slack is picked up by local actors. This theory does not rely on particular
ideological assumptions: to a libertarian, market choices will reward safe farms
and punish unsafe farms; to a communitarian, local communities will support
safe farms and abandon unsafe farms.
Theoretical support for this model comes from James Scott and Robert
Ellickson. James Scott has celebrated and popularized metis: "knowledge
embedded in local experience [as compared] with the more general, abstract
knowledge deployed by the state and its technical agencies.93 Scott quotes
Albert Howard to further explain the concept: "A glance on the part of ... a
butcher accustomed to deal with high class animals, is sufficient to tell him
whether all is well or whether there is something wrong."94 This echoes the
theory of Polyface if consumers see the farm, they will have a good sense of
the relative health and safety of its operations.
Further support for this model comes from Robert Ellickson's analysis of
land disputes in rural California. He ultimately concluded that "neighbors apply
informal norms, rather than formal legal rules, to resolve most of the issues that
arise among them. '95 Ellickson's theory is that "members of a close-knit group
develop and maintain norms whose content serves to maximize the aggregate
welfare that members obtain in their workaday affairs with one another."96 In
other words, as long as local farmers and local consumers have the kind of close-
knit relations created by repeated interactions, their norms of food safety and
consumption will tend to maximize both parties' welfare. To the extent that
legislatures recognize or acknowledge either justification for leaving issues to
local parties (Scott's metis or Ellickson's norms), they too could be the source of
exemptions like those in the PPIA.
93. JAMES SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: How CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE
HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 311 (1998).
94. Id at 330.
95. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES 1 (1991).
96. Id at 167.
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The third, and final, hypothesis for the origin of exemptions leads us back
to a modem theory of American federalism. Three years before the PPIA became
law, Herbert Wechsler argued that federalism was preserved not only through
the states acting as "separate sources of authority," but also through the states'
role "in the composition and selection of the [federal] government."'97 Local
districts pick national representatives, states pick senators, and states pick
presidential electors. Therefore, to the extent that "local sensitivity exists, it
cannot fail to find a reflection in the Congress."98 The Supreme Court has
endorsed this theory above the conventional "separate spheres" federalism story:
"[T]he Framers chose to rely on a federal system in which special restraints on
federal power over the States inhered principally in the workings of the National
Government itself, rather than in discrete limitations on the objects of federal
authority."99
In this "process federalism" model, the federal government itself
legitimately and sincerely reflects state and local interests as much as national
interests. For example, Representative Purcell, from the 1968 congressional
debates, was elected by a local district in Texas.'00 Senator Humphrey, in 1957,
was accountable to the voters of Minnesota.10 Under this theory, Congress is
incentivized to provide local exemptions to national laws because the members
of the national legislature themselves are representatives of states or local
districts.
Viewing the PPIA exemption in this light could be significant because it
would provide empirical support to an otherwise mostly theoretical
understanding of federalism that has found favor in the academy and Supreme
Court. Real-life examples of Wechsler's theory would provide proof that his, and
the Court's, theory of federalism actually works in practice.
These three hypotheses all work together to help explain where exemption
federalism might come from. Exemptions from national programs recognize the
difficulty of regulating truly local affairs from Washington, D.C., defer to on-
the-ground expertise, and come from locally-elected national politicians
surprisingly sensitive to local concerns. The first two hypotheses explain why
the national legislature might find these exemptions valuable, and how they
connect to federalist values like subsidiarity. The final hypothesis explains why
national legislators would be especially perhaps surprisingly-receptive to
local concerns.
97. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 543 (1954).
98. Id at 547.
99. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985).
100. GPO, Biographical Directory of the United States Congress 1774-2005 at 440,
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CDOC-108hdoc222/pdf/GPO-CDOC-108hdoc222.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U4ZQ-BQQ8].
101. Id. at 413.
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B. Why Not Exemption Federalism?
There are important caveats and possible counterarguments o exemption
federalism. First, Edward Rubin and Malcolm Feeley have argued that
"decentralization" when the federal government leaves regulation or
implementation to the states is not actually "federalism" at all." 2 From this
perspective, exemption federalism is not real federalism. In that case, however,
neither is "intrastatutory federalism," "field office federalism," or "federalism by
waiver."'10 3 Ultimately, this Note agrees with Barry Friedman: federalism is the
kind of decentralization we have in this country, and the two concepts of
federalism and decentralization are not as easily separable as Rubin and Feeley
suggest.0 4 This Note also agrees with Gluck's "intrastatutory" project: 105 rather
than insist on a pure federalism that may not exist (any longer), it is more
interesting and relevant to ask what kinds of federalism exist here and now.
Second, to what extent can exemptions be labelled "federalist" or
"federalism-promoting" if that was not the intended goal or explicit origin of the
legislation? For example, in the pharmacy hypothetical from Part I, what if no
legislator ever said anything like, "This exemption is meant to preserve our
American system of federalism?" What if every discussion was centered around
the language of cost-benefit analysis and whether it would be too expensive to
regulate every little mom-and-pop drugstore? Or, to take the PPIA case study
from Part II, what if the exemption "came from" the dedicated lobbying of the
poultry (or turkey) interests? In other words, do either lobbying or cost-benefit
analysis explain the exemptions better than a theory of federalism? Ultimately,
these critiques are more question-begging than theory-undermining. Stories of
cost-benefit analyses or successful lobbying themselves contain underlying
value assumptions: why did Congress find this analysis, or this lobbyist,
persuasive? Specifically, why would a national legislator be persuaded by the
cost constraints of a small farmer (versus the efficiency benefits of a nationally-
standardized market), or be receptive to local-interest lobbyists (versus the
arguments of non-exempted national brands)? When lobbying or cost-benefit
analyses themselves speak in federalist terms, they are constituent parts of not
counterarguments to a federalist theory. The terms (or values, or goals) of
federalism include: greater public participation in democracy; greater
accountability; more state and local innovation; better protection of health,
safety, and welfare; protection or promotion of cultural and local diversity; and
102. Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 911 (1994).
103. Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MiNN. L. REV. 317,368 (1997) ("[M]uch
of the devolutionary legislation is 'field office federalism,' in which the national government dictates the
terms of the transfer of power and retains substantial power to see that its will is done.").
104. Id. at 381-82.
105. Gluck, supra note 12.
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diffusion of power to protect liberty.10 6 An argument that local exemptions could
protect local businesses, save money, protect consumers, provide diversity, or
maintain accountability is a cost-benefit argument. But it is also a federalist
argument. When a law or exemption promotes federalist values, it can usefully
be described as federalism-supporting, whether or not that is the explicit
language preserved in the Congressional Record.
10 7
A third caveat or counterargument: exemption federalism akes an
assumption familiar to farmers' markets and chambers of commerce
everywhere that "small" and "local" can be relatively synonymous. This is
perhaps an uncontroversial assumption because businesses with hundreds of
locations and thousands of employees are more likely to be engaged in interstate
commerce than a standalone shop with two workers. But it may not always apply.
Imagine a Silicon Valley technology firm with ten employees and a global
presence, or a large, multi-location barbecue chain that only operates in Texas.
Still, it is intuitive and helpful to assume that small is more often intrastate and
large is more often interstate.
Fourth, and last, it is worth noting that not all exemptions can or should be
categorized as exemption federalism. For example, many nonprofit
organizations rely on exemptions from various provisions of the tax code. These
exemptions are better described as a "subsidy for nonprofit organizations that
provide some good or service that benefits society or is otherwise
underproduced."'10 8 Thus, while these exemptions reflect value choices, they do
not reflect standard federalist values. Religious exemptions provide a similar
example although there may be some federalism overlap, to the extent that
Friedman is correct to list "liberty protection" as a federalist value.0 9 Or consider
the many other exemptions that riddle the tax code, most of which may be better
theorized as the result of special interests, as opposed to federalism values.'l l
Just as exemption federalism is not meant to be a comprehensive theory of
federalism, it is not meant o be a comprehensive theory of exemptions."'
106. Friedman, supra note 103, at 389-404.
107. Imagine, for instance, an argument that some local-innovation program was not
about promoting "federalism," it was about promoting "laboratories of democracy." See New State Ice
Co. v. Liebmarm, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("a single courageous State may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory"). Clearly, a program that is designed to satisfy such a famous
value of federalism can be described as federalism-promoting. Similarly, a cost-benefit analysis that
demonstrates the economic value of subsidiarity co-exists with and even helps explain-federalism
arguments. See supra Section III.A.
108. Philip T. Hackney, What We Talk About When We Talk About Tax Exemption, 33
VA. TAX REV. 115, 117 (2013); see also Henry Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE
L.J. 835 (1980).
109. Friedman, supra note 103, at 402.
110. Daniel J. Mitchell, Everything You Need to Know About Deductions, Loopholes,
and Special-Interest Tax Provisions, CATO INSTITUTE (Nov. 30, 2015),
https://www.cato.org/blog/everything-you-need-know-about-deductions-loopholes-special-interest-tax-
provisions [https://perma.cc/AW7L-CMC4].
111. Though, unlike the well-trodden ground of federalism theory, "exemptions" as a
category in the law remains a remarkably undertheorized area of study and research.
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C. Where Next for Exemption Federalism?
If exemption federalism helps explain the PPIA, it may also explain similar
exemptions especially when the majority of an industry is concentrated in
nationwide operators, but the bulk of operators are small and local. Indeed, in
addition to the PPIA, exemption federalism may already help us understand
aspects of landmark statutes like the Affordable Care Act, the Fair Housing Act,
and the Dodd-Frank Act. It can also add to the discussion and analysis around
proposed laws and their exemptions, such as Elizabeth Warren's suggested
Accountable Capitalism Act."12
In a recent article, Abbe Gluck and Nicole Huberfeld analyze and criticize
the role of federalism in the Affordable Care Act (ACA)." 3 But they only view
the federalist aspects of the ACA as originating from the ways in which Congress
chose to "incorporate states into federal schemes."'"1 4 Exemption federalism
provides an additional perspective. The ACA originally exempted employers
with fewer than fifty employees from the Act's mandate.1 5 This exempted 96%
of employers in the United States"l 6 while covering the vast majority of
employees, who generally work for large employers."' While agreeing with
Gluck and Huberfeld that "separate spheres" or "dual" federalism does not
explain the ACA (that is, agreeing that there is a federal role in health insurance),
exemption federalism also sees federalism in the ways small players were
exempted and not only in the ways states were included. In this way, the ACA is
significantly more federalism-promoting than its critics or even Gluck and
Huberfeld acknowledge.
Another landmark statute from the Obama-era, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, similarly exhibits features of exemption
federalism. Dodd-Frank holds systematically important financial institutions to
higher regulatory standards and measures the systemic importance of traditional
banks by size."I8 Below the cutoff, banks are "exempt" from some of Dodd-
Frank's requirements. Recently, the Senate reached a bipartisan agreement to
raise the systemically-important cutoff from fifty billion to two hundred and fifty
112. 164 CONG. REC. S5,618 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 2018).
113. Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 7.
114. Id. at 1697.
115. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2018); IRS, Find OutHowACA Affects Employers withFewer
Than 50 Employees (May 13, 2015), https://www.irs.gov/affordable-care-act/individuals-and-
families/find-out-how-aca-affects-employers-with-fewer-than-50-employees [https:Hperma.cc/KCC2-
9TQW].
116. U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, Fact Sheet: Final Regulations Implementing Employer
Shared Responsibility Under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) for 2015, https://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Documents/Fact%/20Sheet%/20021014.pdf [https://perma.cc/83KR-2MLV].
117. Theo Francis, Why You Probably Workfor a Giant Company, in 20 Charts, WALL
ST. J. (Apr. 6, 2017), http://www.wsj.com/graphics/big-companies-get-bigger [https://perma.cc/G3K7-
MQ49].
118. MARC LABONTE & DAVID W. PERKINS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45036, BANK
SYSTEMIC RISK REGULATION: THE $50 BILLION THRESHOLD IN THE DODD-FRANK ACT (2017).
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billion dollars in assets.119 Discussion surrounding this change has been a
textbook study in exemption federalism. The theory requires some elision
between small and local, or intrastate, and large and interstate. The discussion
around Dodd-Frank exhibits that elision. Reports on which banks would be
exempted describe the institutions as "small and regional"'120 or as "deriv[ing]
most of their funds and lending operations in the local areas where they
operate."'12 1 The expanded exemption is meant to "relieve community banks" but
"rein in the large financial institutions"'122 that have been described as "globally
systemically important."123 In 2017, the smallest of those large institutions was
HSBC North America Holdings Inc., a massive multinational "serv[ing] clients
worldwide.' 24 Here too, then, we see a regulatory landscape rarely described as
federalist but exhibiting classic federalist traits. Small, local operators are
exempt from (some) federal regulations but are still subject to state oversight.
Large, interstate or international operators are not exempt at all.
Not all examples of exemption federalism are obviously or even arguably
positive, just as federalism more broadly is a mixed bag. The small-operator
exemption in the Fair Housing Act (FHA) is a good example of the negative
impacts of exemption federalism. The FHA allows owners who rent four or
fewer units and live in one of those units to ignore certain provisions of the
Act. 125 One of the values of centralization, as opposed to the values of
federalism, is a polity-wide baseline in fundamental rights.126 But the FHA
exemption, sometimes known as the "Mrs. Murphy" exemption, allows small
landlords across the country to discriminate. 127 If the housing market resembles
agriculture or the other concentrated markets discussed above, this exemption
would impact a larger percentage of landlords ("producers" of housing) than
renters ("consumers" of housing). But there may be no reason to tolerate state
119. Andrew Ackerman et al., Senators Support Rollhack ofBank Oversight, WALL ST.
J. (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/senate-lawmakers-reach-tentative-deal-to-ease-post-
crisis-bank-rules- 1510593991 [https://perma.cc/3CWD-UMET].
120. Id.
121. Emily Stewart, The Bank Deregulation Bill the Senate Just Passed Explained,
Vox (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/3/6/17081508/senate-banking-bill-
crapo-regulation [https://perma.cc/N3M8-6S8E].
122. Id.
123. Donna Borak, Fed: Banks Under $250 Billion Threshold Get Break on Stress
Tests, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-banks-under-250-billion-threshold-
get-break-on-stress-tests- 1485812085 [https://perma.cc/7MHZ-P4LD].
124. LABONTE & PERKINS, supra note 118, at 4 tbl. 1; see also HSBC North America
Holdings Inc., BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/profiles/companies/8207521Z:US-hsbc-north-
america-holdings-inc [https://perma.cc/36NY-GHEJ].
125. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (2018); James D. Walsh, Reaching Mrs. Murphy: A Call
for Repeal of the Mrs. Murphy Exemption to the Fair Housing Act, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 605, 605
(1999) ("Section 3603(b)(2) ... exempts dwellings intended to be occupied by four or fewer families
from the prohibitions of § 3604, other than § 3604(c), if the owner lives in one of the units).
126. Friedman, supra note 103, at 319 (listing "the reasons for exercising national or
central control, [including to] provide a national floor on fundamental rights.").
127. Walsh, supra note 125, at 607 ("The existence of an exemption for owner-
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diversity in baseline anti-discrimination measures at all. Just as the value of
federalism in this area is questionable, the value of exemption federalism is also
questionable. Indeed, there have been repeated calls to repeal the exemption,
though it still remains.'2 8 Nonetheless, as is true throughout these examples,
states are free to regulate themselves. In Vermont, for instance, a state fair
housing law restricts the exemption to owner-occupiers of dwellings with no
more than three, instead of four, units.129 And in New York, the exemption is
further restricted to two-unit dwellings only.130 While a nationwide standard
applies to all large operators, small operators exist in a diverse, state-regulated
landscape.
The latest example of exemption federalism may be Senator Elizabeth
Warren's proposed "Accountable Capitalism Act," which, like Dodd-Frank,
would have stricter regulations for larger institutions.131 Also like Dodd-Frank,
the discussion around the Act perfectly illuminates the assumptions and values
of exemption federalism. For instance, one account of the Act explained that
some provisions would cover "any corporation with revenue over $1 billion,"
which is "only a few thousand companies, but a large share of overall
employment and economic activity ... 132
This realization that the federal government can regulate a national market
while exempting most local operators is the core of exemption federalism. While
the realization occasionally shows up, as in some journalistic coverage of
Warren's Act,133 or legislative debates around agricultural bills, 134 it remains
understudied. Without a name, recognition of this phenomenon has been isolated
to its individual occurrences, with the general pattern unnoticed. Exemption
federalism hopes to tie these threads together and explain the intriguing
similarities of the PPIA, ACA, FHA, and other laws. As a positive matter, the
theory is worth discussing under the rubric of federalism because that is how it
manifests itself: as national regulation of interstate operators and local regulation
of local players. As a normative matter, the theory is worth discussing because
it may connect he national regulatory ambitions of Congress and the federalist
ideals of today's Court. A vocabulary that can describe these national regulatory
programs in their federalist aspects has value in bridging differences between
centralizers and localists. Furthermore, the Court has so far been suspicious and
128. Id.
129. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4504(2) (2018).
130. See, e.g., N.Y. ST. OFF. OF THEATT'Y GEN., FairHousing, https://ag.ny.gov/civil-
rights/fair-housing [https:Hperma.cc/HF9T-BYUL].
131. 164 CONG. REC. S5,618 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 2018) ("A bill to establish the
obligations of certain large business entities in the United States").
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unreceptive to nontraditional flavors of federalism.135 Perhaps exemption
federalism will prove more attractive. Whether dealing with small-scale wheat
growers136 or health insurance mandates,37 the Court has struggled to adjust the
boundaries of modem American federalism. But reconsider the fact that most
supermarket chickens nationwide have been inspected by a national overseer, yet
most farmers are subject only to the rules of their community. That seems,
hopefully, like a promising compromise.
135. See, e.g., Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes, supra note 14, at 1750
(arguing that the ACA exhibited federalism through "intrastatutory" federalism, but that Nat'l Fed'n of
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012), revealed "that the Court emphatically disagrees").
136. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
137. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
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